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Abstract 
The damages caused by cyber-attacks are becoming larger, broader and more serious as well 
as to include monetary losses and losses of lifeline. Some cyber-attacks are arguably 
suspected to be parts of national campaigns. Under such circumstances, efforts by the private 
sector are not enough to counteract against cyber-attacks, and the public sector must 
endeavour to enhance national cybersecurity capacities so that the nation can retain safe and 
secure life of nationals. We think it very important to ensure that the national cybersecurity 
strategies are sufficient, appropriate and up-to-dated, so that the national capacities 
progress towards the right direction at the adequate speed. 
Thus, we devised the method to review national cybersecurity strategies and used it to review 
the UK cybersecurity strategy. The result proved that the carefully formulated national 
strategies still need review and the method should work. 
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Background 
Cyber incidents are reported almost everyday. Although the targets, the attack methods, the damages, 
the presumed attackers and the presumed objectives are various, the impacts seem to be getting larger, 
broader and more serious. In October 2017, Yahoo! announced that it’d had 3 billion customer data 
exfiltrated by cyber-attack (Oath Inc. 2017). In February 2016, Bangladesh Bank, the central bank of 
Bangladesh, was attacked and had US$ 951 million stolen via SWIFT network (New York Times 2016). 
In December 2015 and in December 2016, Ukraine experienced wide area power downs due to cyber-
attacks (SANS ICS 2016) (SANS ICS 2016). Now cyber-attacks can cause huge impact, monetary 
damages and even affect daily life of citizens. Some incidents are arguably suspected to be parts of 
national campaigns (The United States Executive Order 2015). 
Under such circumstances, efforts by the private sector including individuals are not enough to 
counteract against cyber-attacks, and the public sector must endeavour to enhance national 
cybersecurity capacities so that the nation can retain safe and secure life of nationals. 
Tagawa and Hayashi (2017) think it necessary to seek enhancement of the national cybersecurity in 
every aspect with the combined efforts of the whole country. They also think it should be done by 
building the proactive national cybersecurity capacities, based on the sustained and private-sector-
initiated reactive cybersecurity countermeasures (original in Japanese). 
 
Now that responsibilities of the public sector to enhance national cybersecurity are essential, we think 
it very important to ensure that the national cybersecurity strategies are sufficient, appropriate and up-
to-dated, so that the national capacities progress towards the right direction at the adequate speed. If the 
strategies are insufficient, inappropriate or out-of-dated, nations’ ICTs can be endangered, so is the 
daily life of the nationals, while the excessive strategies will end up as a waste of taxpayers’ money. 
There are several trials for cybersecurity benchmarking for nations. Global Cybersecurity Indices 
announced by ITU (International Telecommunication Union) and the Cybersecurity 
Capability/Capacity Maturity Models developed by the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre founded 
around the Oxford University are the examples of those kind (ITU 2017) (Global Cyber Security 
Capacity Centre 2014) (Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre 2017). Benchmarking gives us the idea 
that shows a nation’s relative cybersecurity strength among the world. However, as technology, skills 
of attackers and capacities of other nations develop, a nation must pay a lot of deals to hang onto the 
pace. Furthermore, if the nation’s current benchmarking result is not satisfactory, it must work even 
harder to surpass the development speed of the others. 
Therefore, while benchmarking gives us the important information of the current capacity of the nation, 
it is just a snapshot and more importantly we need to know whether the nation’s cybersecurity capacities 
are advancing to the desirable level in the coming years. Thus, we point out importance to review the 
national strategies of cybersecurity capacity enhancement. 
Relationship of circumstances, public sectors’ responsibilities, benchmarking and review of strategies 
is shown in the Figure 1, and relationship of development speed of nations and attackers, benchmarking 
and review of strategies is shown in the Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Circumstances, Responsibilities, Benchmarking & Review of Strategies 
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Figure 2.  Development speed of Nations and Attackers, Benchmarking & Review of Strategies 
 
The United Kingdom (hereafter “UK”), where the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre is located, 
carried out the official assessment of its cybersecurity capability using the Cybersecurity Capability 
Maturity Model in 2015 (the result was reported in November 2016) (Global Cyber Security Capacity 
Centre 2016). In November 2016, the government of UK announced its “National Cyber Security 
Strategy 2016-2021” (Government of UK 2016). The assessment is assumed to be reflected into the 
strategy, and the comparison of the two is supposed to show if the cybersecurity strategies are sufficient 
and appropriate. 
Cybersecurity Capability/Capacity Maturity Model 
The Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre founded around the Oxford University released the 
Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (hereafter “CSCMM”) v1.2 in December 2014 as the first 
public edition and the Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for Nations Revised Edition (hereafter 
“CSCMMN”) in February 2017. 
The Cybersecurity Capability/Capacity Maturity Models are aimed at assisting nations improve their 
cybersecurity capabilities in a systematic and substantive way. 
The Centre considers cybersecurity capacity to comprise the following five ‘Dimensions’. 
1. Devising cybersecurity policy and strategy 
2. Encouraging responsible cybersecurity culture within society 
3. Developing cybersecurity knowledge 
4. Creating effective legal and regulatory frameworks 
5. Controlling risks through standards, organisations and technologies 
Each dimension is categorized into several ‘Factors’, which then are divided into multiple ‘Aspects’ (in 
Revised Edition. It was called as ‘Categories’ in the v1.2). The Revised Edition has 5 dimensions, 24 
factors and 53 aspects (v1.2 has 5 dimensions, 20 factors and 47 categories). 
The Centre also defined the 5 ‘Stages’ (‘Levels’ in the v1.2) as the degree of the progress of the nation 
in relation to a certain aspect of cybersecurity capacity. The 5 stages are ‘Start-up’, ‘Formative’, 
‘Established’, ‘Strategic’ and ‘Dynamic’. Each stage has ‘Indicators’ which describe the steps, actions, 
or building blocks that are indicative of a specific stage of maturity within a distinct aspect. A Nation 
must fulfil all indicators within a particular stage to elevate to the next stage. 
The relationship of ‘Dimension’, ‘Factor’, ‘Aspect’, ‘Stage’ and ‘Indicator’ is shown in the Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Relationship of Elements in CSCMMN 
(produced based on the Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for Nations Revised Edition) 
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Uganda, Senegal, Bhutan and Kosovo had pilot assessment using v1.2 and the official assessment of 
the U.K. was done with the same version (Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre 2016) (Global Cyber 
Security Capacity Centre 2016) (Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre 2015) (Global Cyber Security 
Capacity Centre 2015) (Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre 2016). Assessment using the Revised 
Edition may possibly be underway but hasn’t been announced yet. 
Cyber Security Strategy of the UK 
The UK released the National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 in November 2016 and stated in its 
“Foreword” that ‘Much of our prosperity now depends on our ability to secure our technology, data and 
networks from the many threats we face. Yet cyber-attacks are growing more frequent, sophisticated 
and damaging when they succeed. So, we are taking decisive action to protect both our economy and 
the privacy of UK citizens.’ 
The UK had formerly announced the UK Cyber Security Strategy 2011-2016 (Government of UK 2011) 
with £860m underpinned for the National Cyber Security Programme. Under the new strategy, the UK 
‘will invest £1.9 billion in defending our systems and infrastructure, deterring our adversaries, and 
developing a whole-society capability - from the biggest companies to the individual citizen.’ 
In the new strategy, the cybersecurity policies are described in the categories - Defend, Deter, Develop 
and International Action. 
The report of assessment using the CSCMM, “Cybersecurity Capacity Review of the United Kingdom”, 
states in its ‘Introduction’ that the evaluation ‘will contribute to the development of the UK National 
Cybersecurity Strategy 2016–2020.’ 
Comparing Assessment & Strategy 
As mentioned in the “Background”, comparison of the assessment and the strategy may reveal 
sufficiency and appropriateness of the cybersecurity strategy of the UK because the strategy was 
decided based on the assessment, assuming the CSCMMN which gave the gauge to assessment 
represents the definitive sufficiency and appropriateness for the desired state of the national 
cybersecurity. 
Comparison, in my research, is done by ‘mapping’ the national cybersecurity strategies to the 
CSCMMN and examining if the strategies are laid out adequately based on the result of assessment. 
‘Mapping’ in this case means to find out the indicator(s) of the CSCMMN which an approach is 
expected to achieve or to contribute achieving. If the strategies (or, the approaches described in the 
strategies) are sufficient and appropriate, they will sit in the stages next to the stages where the nation 
currently stands. 
For example, if the nation is at ‘Established’ stage (3rd stage from the lowest) in a particular aspect, the 
approaches intended to achieve ‘Strategic’ stage (4th stage) will be adequate, while the approaches for 
‘Formative’ stage (2nd stage) would be questionable. Please refer to the Figure 4. 
 
 Start-up Formative Established Strategic Dynamic 
Aspect Assessment achieved achieved achieved unachieved unachieved 
Approaches  ###  ###  
 
 
Figure 4.  Adequate Approaches & Questionable Approaches 
 
When the nation stands at the relatively lower stages, i.e. ‘Start-up’ or ‘Formative’ in some aspects, if 
the nation plans to have no or few approaches to achieve the ‘Established’ stage or higher, the capacity 
of the nation in those aspects will remain at the lower stages and become even weaker as the capacities 
of the others develop. In such cases, the cybersecurity strategy of the nation should be considered 
insufficient in those aspects. On the other hand, if pretty much proportion of the approaches are 
concentrated to a few aspects, the approaches need to be examined if there’s no duplication of the 
approaches to realize the same thing, out-of-dated approaches which cannot be terminated by some 
Questionable Adequate 
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reasons nor any other inefficient approaches. If any, those approaches should be considered 
inappropriate. Examples are shown in the Figure 5. 
 
 Start-up Formative Established Strategic Dynamic 
Aspect 
1 
Assessment achieved achieved unachieved unachieved unachieved 
Approaches - some few no no 
Aspect 
2 
Assessment achieved achieved achieved achieved unachieved 
Approaches - some many many many 
 
Figure 5.  (possibly) Insufficient Approaches & (possibly) Inappropriate Approaches 
Practical Work of Comparison 
Firstly, the cybersecurity approaches described in the National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 must 
be broken down to the pieces of the practical actions. I call them as the “Action Items”. I extracted 142 
action items from the strategy. 
Secondly, each action items are mapped on to the CSCMMN, in other words, I sought the indicators 
which each action item will achieve or contribute to achieve. I call this interconnection as the “Relation”, 
or “action item A is related to indicator X”. Some action items have two or more relations and I found 
307 relations in total. 
Next, 307 relations are aggregated by the aspects, then by the factors (upper categorization to the aspect). 
Finally, the number of the relations by the factors are compared with the stages that the UK was 
evaluated to have achieved. 
The image of “mapping” is shown in the Figure 6. 
 
  Start-up Formative Established Strategic Dynamic 
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Figure 6.  “Mapping” 
Result of Comparison and Findings 
Result of Comparison 
The result of comparison is shown in the Table 1. 
Please note that the ‘Start-up’ stage is omitted from the table. The ‘Start-up’ stage is the lowest stage 
and the nation who doesn’t achieve the ‘Formative’ stage (2nd stage) will be automatically positioned 
as the ‘Start-up’. The indicators of the ‘Start-up’ are not the kind of criteria, but the explanation of the 
state. Therefore, there’s no cybersecurity approach to have a relation with the indicators of the ‘Start-
up’. 
The red coloured cells indicate the achieved stages while the blues are unachieved. 
Please also note that the official UK assessment was done with the CSCMM (v1.2) and my comparison 
work is based on the CSCMMN (Revised Edition). The newer version has 24 factors while the older 
has 20 (4 factors combined into 2, and 6 factors added). The white cells mean the factors are not 
officially assessed. 
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Table 1.  Result of Comparison (aggregated by Factor) 
# Dimension Factor 2nd 3rd 4th 5th T 
11 
Cybersecurity Policy 
and Strategy  
National Cybersecurity Strategy  0 0 1 6 7 
12 Incident Response 0 3 10 6 19 
13 Critical Infrastructure (CI) Protection 0 1 7 5 13 
14 Crisis Management 0 2 4 5 11 
15 Cyber Defence 0 1 14 16 31 
16 Communications Redundancy  0 0 4 3 7 
21 
Cyber Culture and 
Society 
Cybersecurity Mind-set 0 0 2 4 6 
22 Trust and Confidence on the Internet 0 4 2 5 11 
23 
User Understanding of Personal 
Information Protection Online 
0 0 0 0 0 
24 Reporting Mechanisms 0 2 0 0 2 
25 Media and Social Media 0 0 0 0 0 
31 Cybersecurity 
Education, Training 
and Skills 
Awareness Raising 0 1 7 6 14 
32 Framework for Education 0 9 16 31 56 
33 Framework for Professional Training 0 2 11 6 19 
41 
Legal and Regulatory 
Frameworks 
Legal Framework 0 0 1 14 15 
42 Criminal Justice System 0 0 10 7 17 
43 
Formal and Informal Cooperation 
Frameworks to Combat Cybercrime 
0 1 5 5 11 
51 
Standards, 
Organisations, and 
Technologies 
Adherence to Standards 0 10 9 0 19 
52 Internet Infrastructure Resilience 0 1 4 0 5 
53 Software Quality 0 2 1 0 3 
54 Technical Security Controls 0 5 3 13 21 
55 Cryptographic Controls 0 0 0 4 4 
56 Cybersecurity Marketplace 0 0 5 11 16 
57 Responsible Disclosure 0 0 0 0 0 
D1 Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy  0 7 40 41 88 
D2 Cyber Culture and Society 0 6 4 9 19 
D3 Cybersecurity Education, Training and Skills 0 12 34 43 89 
D4 Legal and Regulatory Frameworks 0 1 16 26 43 
D5 Standards, Organisations, and Technologies 0 18 22 28 68 
Total 0 44 116 147 307 
 
  achieved 'Stage'   unachieved 'Stage'   ‘Factor’ doesn't exist in v1.2 
Findings 
The factors ‘User Understanding of Personal Information Protection Online’, ‘Reporting Mechanisms’, 
‘Media and Social Media’ and ‘Responsible Disclosure’ have no or few relations. It means the UK is 
not eager to develop their capacities in these fields. 
The UK’s current standings in both ‘User Understanding of Personal Information Protection Online’ 
and ‘Responsible Disclosure’ are ‘Established’ stage (3rd stage). The UK may possibly be satisfied with 
the current achievement, although I suspect not. 
The factors ‘Reporting Mechanisms’ and ‘Media and Social Media’ are the newly added factors in the 
CSCMMN. The UK may have been unenlightened to those fields when they formulated the strategy. 
Otherwise, there’s no factor where the comparison reveals the UK cybersecurity approaches are 
insufficient nor inappropriate – most of the relations are concentrated to the blue zone, i.e. the stages to 
which the UK is supposed to aim at stepping up while the reasonable portion of the relations are 
allocated to the highest stages of the red zone, i.e. the stages which the UK is supposed to aim at 
maintaining. 
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Conclusion and Research Plan 
According to our analysis, the UK cybersecurity strategy looks almost sufficient and appropriate with 
some areas which include few approaches to enhance capacities and, therefore, may need further 
examination whether the nation already has adequate capacities in these areas. 
This result means; 
- Carefully formulated cybersecurity strategies still need review. 
- The method to “map” the approaches to the CSCMMN should work. 
But it is not clear yet that the CSCMMN is the best tool to which the approaches are “mapped”. There 
may be better tools for that purpose, or we think we could create one. 
 
My future research will include; 
- Review other nations’ cybersecurity strategies to prove necessity of the strategy review, 
- Seek for improvement of the method and 
- Search for the better analysis tools. 
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